Dynamic Channel Screening in the Higher Order π-Calculus  by Vivas, José-Luis & Yoshida, Nobuko
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 66 No. 3 (2002)
URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume66.html 15 pages
Dynamic Channel Screening
in the Higher Order π-Calculus
Jose´ Luis Vivas 1
Hewlett-Packard Laboratories (HPL)
Bristol, UK
Nobuko Yoshida 2
Department of Computing
Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine
University of London, UK
Abstract
Recently programming languages have been designed to support mobile code, i.e.
higher-order code that is transferred from a remote location or domain and executed
within the local environment. This may expose the internal interfaces and objects
within a location to attacks by mobile code. In this work, we propose an extension
of notations based on the Higher-Order π-calculus with primitive operators, called
screening operators, whose role is to protect internal interfaces by dynamically re-
stricting the visibility of channels. The usefulness of these operators is illustrated
by applications involving resource access control. We show how restrictions on re-
source access control can be enforced dynamically in terms of screening operators,
and contrast it with an alternative approach in which restrictions on the behaviour
of processes are based on the notion of process type [17] and intended to be checked
statically.
1 Introduction
Recently programming languages have been designed to support mobile code,
i.e. higher-order code that is transferred from a remote location or domain and
executed within the local environment. This may expose the internal interfaces
and objects within a location to attacks by mobile code. There are several
techniques for securing mobile code. These techniques are usually based on the
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administration of access rights and capabilities assigned to processes, and are
enforced either statically (during compilation), or dynamically (at runtime).
The technique for statically checking mobile code is based on the notion
of typing and type safety. However, in current systems access restrictions as
a rule are enforced dynamically by runtime monitoring of process execution.
Static checking of properties is as a rule not suﬃcient to ensure safety. In Java,
for instance, there is a scheme called the Sandbox model of protection against
mobile code [9]. This model includes both static and dynamic checking. The
type system of Java is used basically as an aid to the security manager, a kind
of reference monitor: if the type system is correct, the security manager will be
safe. The access control mechanism must nevertheless be ultimately performed
by the security manager at runtime. The conclusion is that access control
safety can at best be enforced by a mix of static and dynamic techniques.
In the π-calculus and its higher-order extension, access rights have been
largely encoded in terms of types, either channel types denoting capabilities
[11,5,8,16], or process types denoting the interfaces of processes [17]. This
discrepancy might be a result of the limitations in the expressiveness of the
π-calculus with regard to the notions of locality and restriction of channel
visibility. Apparently these notions can only be encoded if the basic calculus
is extended with higher order constructs and locality primitives [4,5,1].
The reduction of higher order features to ﬁrst order ones [12] in the π-
calculus is based on the claim that only access to agents need be transmitted,
not the agents themselves. This works only because notions of locality are
absent from the calculus [13]. But in the presence of locations we need to
distinguish between agent passing and agent execution. Agents may be passed
by reference, but retrieving an agent or a piece of code from some place in
memory and executing it in a determined location - common in object-oriented
languages and systems - is a typically higher order operation that cannot be
easily reduced to reference passing.
The objective of this work is to investigate how notations based on the
π-calculus may be extended with channel screening operators. We extend the
π-calculus with a new operator called polarised ﬁlter, or simply ﬁlter. The
ﬁlter operator allows a process within its scope to communicate with the envi-
ronment only along the channels included in a ﬁnite set of polarised channels.
A related type of screening operator is the blocking operator presented in
[13,3], which can also be reﬁned to blocking with polarised channels [6].
Screening operators have a dual nature. By reducing the visibility of chan-
nels these operators block external communication but permit local commu-
nication along screened channels, in this way contextualising the meaning of
channel names. As a result, they may be used to encode the notions of name
space (cf. Java’s dynamic linking of applets [15]), encapsulation, and dynamic
binding of names, ubiquitous in distributed an object-based systems. In fact,
it was noted long ago that in the object-oriented paradigm “the idea of encap-
sulation can be modeled by restricting the visibility of operators” (Abramsky
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[10]). This is exactly what screening operators are supposed to do. The re-
striction operator of the π-calculus does this very imperfectly because of the
phenomenon of channel extrusion. Restricting the visibility of names cannot
be reduced to the creation of fresh names. Invisible channels may still be
named or referenced, cf. method calls in objects, at the same time that en-
capsulation is guaranteed. The restricted channels of the π-calculus, however,
can be extruded, maybe by accident, thus exposing the internal interface.
The usefulness of screening operators are illustrated by applications involv-
ing resource access control. We contrast this approach with an alternative one
based on the notion of process type, the λπv-calculus [17], a higher-order cal-
culus based on the λ and the π-calculi. In this calculus, the typing system
can assign non-trivial interface types to many higher-order π-processes, and
functional dependent types to arbitrary higher-order abstracted processes.
We introduce a simple untyped higher-order π-calculus with the ﬁlter op-
erator, called the λπFv-calculus, and show how safety requirements can be
encoded in the λπFv-calculus by providing a security preserving translation
of processes from a subset of the λπv-calculus to the λπFv-calculus. Based
on this result, we can oﬀer an integrated framework to mix both static and
dynamic checking coherently.
Dynamic resource access restriction deﬁned in terms of screening opera-
tors can be regarded as a kind of speciﬁcation for system behaviour. Thus,
under a given interpretation of the security requirements embedded in the
λπv-calculus, we can redeﬁne or translate any agent in this calculus to an
agent in the λπFv-calculus, and determine the conditions under which these
agents show equivalent behaviour. As noted above, this will be shown to be
true only for a subset of the λπv-calculus, thus highlighting important features
of the typing system with respect to the given interpretation. The reason for
this limitation, not unexpectedly, is related to the phenomenon of channel
restriction and extrusion. In this way we claim to have shown an important
property related to the typing system of the λπv-calculus. In our opinion this
method can be generalised to the study of any calculus intended to enforce
resource access control in terms of typing. Roughly, the method is to express
the security requirements in terms of screening operators, and then to compare
both interpretations.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the ﬁlter
operator in the context of the higher order π-calculus. In Section 3 we give
a brief introduction the the λπv-calculus. In Section 4 we present the λπFv-
calculus. In Section 5, we show a translation from the λπv-calculus to the
λπFv-calculus and analyse its adequacy with regard to safety requirements
and process behaviour. In Section 6 we present the conclusions. Due to the
space limitation, we leave all of the detailed deﬁnitions and proofs to the full
version [14].
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2 The Filter Operator
For simplicity we start by introducing the polarised ﬁlter operator as an ex-
tension to the Higher Order (HO)π-calculus. The role of the ﬁlter operator is
to block every action which is not explicitly included in a ﬁnite set of polarised
channel names. We write P L to denote the process P ﬁltered by L, a ﬁnite
set of polarised channel names. A positive polarised channel name z is written
z+, and a negative polarised channel name z is written z−. The meaning of
the ﬁlter operator is given by the rule:
FILT:
P
µ−→ P ′
P L µ−→ P ′L
µ an output along a channel z s.t. z+ ∈ L, or
µ an input along a channel z s.t. z− ∈ L
If both z+ ∈ L and z− ∈ L, we write z ∈ L.
2.1 An Example: Java’s sandbox model
We show an example in a kind of pseudocode based on the HOπ-calculus,
including integer types and integer matching.
Screening primitives like the ﬁlter operator are useful for encoding security
arrangements such as Java’s Sandbox model. The idea behind this model is
to provide a safe environment within which unreliable programs hosted by a
computer may be conﬁned. Depending on the level of trust associated with
it, an imported program may be allowed to access only a restricted number
of resources. Diﬀerent programs may be given diﬀerent environments, each
one deﬁning a distinct set of capabilities for the processes conﬁned within its
bounds.
Environments are deﬁned by a ﬁlter set, each set establishing the resources
that may be accessed. We illustrate this idea by the following example extract-
ed from [9]. A number of diﬀerent-sized sandboxes are deﬁned. The following
resources are part of the system: a CPU CPU, a screen Screen, a keyboard
Keyboard, a mouseMouse, the memoryMemory, a web serverWebServer, and
a local ﬁle system Docs. Each one of these resources may be deﬁned by an
agent guarded by a corresponding channel. Thus, the CPU can be encoded as
a replicated input process CPU
def
= ∗cpu?(X˜).Cpu, where the channel “cpu”
provides access to the resource and “Cpu” denotes the process representing
the CPU. Similarly, the screen can be encoded by Screen
def
= ∗scr?(Y˜ ).Scr.
The other resources are deﬁned similarly.
As the example, let us consider the following four diﬀerent sandboxes.
• Sandbox1: access to the CPU, screen, keyboard, mouse and own memory.
• Sandbox2: access to the CPU, own memory and web server.
• Sandbox3: access to the CPU, own memory, web server, and local ﬁles.
• Sandbox4: access to everything (an open sandbox).
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(Type) α, β, γ . . . (Abbreviation)
Term : ρ ::= π | σH
Base : σB ::= unit | nat | . . . input only : SI def= 〈S,⊥〉
Process : π ::= [∆] | proc output only : SO def= 〈, S〉
HO Value : σH ::= σB | σH → ρ | (x : σ)→ ρ input/output : SIO def= 〈S, S〉
Channel : σ ::= 〈SI, SO〉
Value : τ ::= σH | σ thunk type : 〈∆〉 def= unit→ [∆]
Sort : S ::= (τ1, . . . , τn) |  | ⊥
(Environment) Channel : ∆ ::= ∅ | ∆, u : σ
General : Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, x : τ | Γ, a : σ
Fig. 1. Types for the λπv-Calculus
Then the sandboxes may be deﬁned by the following ﬁlter sets:
Sandbox1 ::= {cpu+, scr+, kb+,ms+,mem+}
Sandbox2 ::= {cpu+,mem+,ws+}
Sandbox3 ::= {cpu+,mem+,ws+, docs+}
Sandbox4 ::= no ﬁlter
Suppose that programs are imported from some trusted channel i together
with an indication of the level of trust of the program corresponding to the
four sandboxes. We could deﬁne an agent that imports programs and trust
indications, and then execute them in a safe environment, as follows:
Handler
def
= ∗i?(X, t).( if t = 1 then XSandbox1
else if t = 2 then XSandbox2
else if t = 3 then XSandbox3
else if t = 4 then X)
The whole system may thus be deﬁned as
System
def
= (Handler | CPU | Scr | . . .){i−, o+}
where o is intended as an output channel.
3 The λπv-Calculus
The λπv-calculus [17] is a typed call-by-value λ-calculus augmented with the
π-calculus primitives, in which arbitrary abstractions, including process ab-
stractions, may be the object of output events. In the sequel we will follow
the notation for process and types given in [17].
The types used in λπv are shown in Fig.1. A set of base types is assumed,
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as well as an inﬁnite set of channel names and an inﬁnite set of variables.
Channel types take the form 〈SI, SO〉, where SI denotes the input sort and SO
the output sort. Two constants ⊥ and  denote the least resp. the greatest
sort type. Values are of three kinds, base types, channel types, and higher
order types. The latter can be either the functional type constructor σH → ρ
or (x : σ)→ ρ, where ρ is either a HO-value type or a process type. The type
(x : σ) → ρ, where σ is a channel type, is a dependent functional type, and
the type ρ may contain occurrences of the variable x.
Processes may have either type proc, the most general process type with
no information about the its interface, or [∆], a ﬁnite mapping from channel
names and variables to channel types indicating that the process P may use
at most the resources in the domain of ∆. Note that this is not true for
derivatives of P , i.e. residues or continuations of P after internal or external
communication events. Thus, the process which inputs a value of type (int)O
(the capability to output values of type int)
P = u?(x : (int)O)x!〈1〉0
has type [u : ((int)O)I], but after importing any channel a of type (int)O
along P , P becomes a!〈1〉0, a process that must contain the channel a in the
domain of its interface. See [17] for the details of the typing system of the
λπv-calculus.
4 The λπFv-Calculus
The λπFv-calculus is basically the λπv-calculus extended with the ﬁlter oper-
ator and without type annotations. The syntax for terms of the λπFv-calculus
is shown in Fig.2. Values consist of identiﬁers and abstractions as in the λ-
calculus. Terms include values, application, literals, and π-calculus terms. The
deﬁnitions of free names and free variables for types and terms are standard.
The reduction semantics (Fig.3) is given in terms of a structural equiva-
lence, denoted ≡, and a reduction relation P −→ Q. The deﬁnition of transi-
tion must allow action across the ﬁlter operator, and thus labelled transition
rules must be introduced. It can be shown that for agents in λπFv without
occurrences of the ﬁlter operator, the reduction rules in [17], with type anno-
tations erased, yield the same relation → for agents in λπFv as the reduction
relation obtained by the reduction rules of Fig.4. If we write −→λπv for the
reduction relation obtained from the former, and −→λπFv for the reduction
relation obtained from the latter, we get the following result:
Lemma 4.1 For any agents P and P ′ in λπFv with no occurrences of the
ﬁlter operator, it holds that P −→λπv P ′ iﬀ P −→λπFv P ′.
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(Term) (Identiﬁer)
P,Q, . . . :: = V value u, v,w, . . . :: = l literal
| 0 nil | x, y, z, . . . variable
| P | P parallel | a, b, c, . . . channel
| u!〈V1, . . . , Vn〉P output
| u?(x1, . . . , xn)P input (Value)
| ∗P replicator V,W, . . . ::= u, v,w, . . . identiﬁer
| (νa)P restriction | λ(x)P abstraction
| PP application
| P L ﬁlter
(Literal) (Filter)
l, l′, . . . ::= () unit L def= ﬁnite set of polarised channels
| 1, 2, 3, . . . number
Fig. 2. Syntax for the λπFv-calculus
5 Encoding λπv into λπFv
We interpret type annotations in higher order input variables as speciﬁcations
of resource access restrictions. These restrictions can be enforced dynamically
by the ﬁlter operator. By way of illustration, consider the agent
c?(X : 〈∆ab〉) run X .
This denotes a process willing to import along the channel c any agent of type
∆ab, which is deﬁned as
∆ab = {a : (int)I, b : (int)O}
i.e. an interface consisting of the channels a and b. Values of integer type may
be imported along a, and exported along b. This may be tentatively encoded
in λπFv with the help of the ﬁlter operator as
c?(X)(X()){a−, b+} .
Pure higher-order passing
This technique cannot though be generalised to ﬁrst-order value passing, cf.
the process
x?(Y : ∆c) runY ,
where
∆c = {c : (intO)I} .
This agent cannot be adequately encoded by
x?(Y ).(Y ()){c−}
since this would mean that a process instantiating Y , e.g.
c?(z : (intO))z!〈1〉 ,
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can only communicate along c, which is not what is expected here. The
interface of this process consists rather of input actions along the channel c
and output actions along any channel of type (int)O. Given the environment
Γ, which we interpret here as the set of globally known channels, this interface
may be extracted. An interpretation of the resource access policy of a process
of this kind is that there are no resources of type (int)I which need protection,
and thus any channel of this type may be allowed to perform output actions
safely. As a result this process can be encoded by
x?(Y ).(runY )B ,
where
B = {c−} ∪ {a+ s.t. Γ  a : (int)O} .
We may thus safely execute the incoming process thunk instantiating the
process variable Y in a context which ﬁlters inputs along c and outputs along
(Reduction)
(input) a?(x1, . . . , xn)P
a?(V1,...,Vn)−→ P{V1/x1, . . . , Vn/xn}
(output) a!〈V1, . . . , Vn〉P a!〈V1,...,Vn〉−→ P
(ﬁlter)
P
α−→ P ′
P L α−→ P ′L
α void or
α = b!〈V˜ 〉 and b+ ∈ L or
α = b?(X˜) and b− ∈ L
(lpar)
P
α−→ P ′
P | Q α−→ P ′ | Q
(com)
P
a?(V1,...,Vn)−→ P ′ Q a!〈V1,...,Vn〉−→ Q′
P | Q −→ P ′ | Q′
(β) (λ(x : τ)P )V −→ P{V/x} (appr)
Q −→ Q′
PQ −→ PQ′
(appl)
P −→ P ′
PV −→ P ′V
(res)
P −→ P ′
(νa)P −→ (νa)P ′
(str)
P ≡ P ′ α−→ Q′ ≡ Q
P
α−→ Q
(Structural Equivalence)
•P ≡ Q if P ≡α Q.
• P | Q ≡ Q | P, (P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R), P | 0 ≡ P, ∗P ≡ P | ∗P
• (νa)0 ≡ 0, (νa)P | Q ≡ (νa)(P | Q) if a ∈ fn(Q)
(νa)(νb)P ≡ (νb)(νa)Q if a = b
• ((νa)P )L ≡ (νa)(P L) if a+ ∈ L and a− ∈ L, 0L ≡ 0
Note that α may be void in any of the reduction rules above.
Fig. 3. Reduction for the λπFv-calculus
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any channel a ∈ dom(Γ) such that
Γ  a : (int)O .
This is the basic idea of the encoding.
Dependent types
Higher order values other than process thunks can be also imported. For
instance, the agent
c?(X : τx)Xa
can be given the type
[c : (τx)
I, a : (int)I, b : (int)O]
where
∆xb = {x : (int)I, b : (int)O} and τx = (x : (int)I)→ [∆xb]
We have now a channel c that admits incoming agents of the dependent type
τx.
The incoming process must, on being applied to any channel a, result in a
process whose interface is a couple of channels a and b of a given type. This
agent can be encoded as
c?(X)(Xa){a−, b+} .
Consider now the process
c?(X : τx, y : (int)
I)Xy .
In this case the channel instantiating x in ∆xb is sent along c together with
an agent of type τx. We encode this process by:
c?(X, y)(Xy){y−, b+} .
Wrapping higher-order variables
The scheme discussed above is still not suﬃciently general. Consider the
process
c?(X : τx, Z : (τx → ρ))ZX .
In this case, X is given as argument to an unknown agent Z. In order
to encode the agent X in a way that preserves the desired behaviour in all
contexts, we have to “wrap” X within an abstraction of the form
λ(y)((Xy){y−, b+})
By wrapping X according to its type, the interface of Xy, i.e. the appli-
cation of X to a channel y, becomes of the desired form. This technique may
be generalised to any number and type of arguments. For instance, consider
a process of the form
c?(X : τxZy, Y : (τxZy → ρ))Y X
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where
τxZy
def
= (x : (int)I)→ σH → (y : (int)O)→ [∆]
for suitable types σH , ρ, and [∆]. As a ﬁrst approximation this process may
be encoded by
c?(X, Y )Y (λ(x)λ(Z)λ(y)(XxZy)F )
where F = IΓ([∆]). Basically, IΓ([∆]) denotes the polarised channels in the
closure of ∆, i.e. the extension of ∆ with all channels in Γ that may be
imported by the process instantiatingX or any of its derivatives. The variables
Y and Z should also be wrapped according their types. The formalisation of
these ideas are given in the next section.
5.1 The Translation
The translation from λπv to λπFv, TΓ, is given in Fig.5. We assume that bound
names have been conveniently renamed in order to avoid name clashes. This
translation extends to abstractions. Basically, TΓ is a homomorphism over all
process operators and abstractions. The interesting point is the translation of
an agent variable x, which depends on the type τ of the variable, and is deﬁned
as FΓ(x, τ), which roughly “wraps” a higher order variable x according to its
type, at the same time forcing x to execute within the scope of a ﬁlter operator
embodying the restrictions on x’s behaviour expressed by type annotations.
The predicate CΓ([∆]), deﬁned in Fig.5, denotes the closure of the process
type [∆] (unionsq is a partial least upper bound operator which intuitively calculates
the union of the accessibility of two capabilities). It can be shown that CΓ(π)
is the minimal closure of π, i.e. if u+ ∈ dom(CΓ(π)) (resp. u− ∈ dom(CΓ(π)))
then there is a process P such that Γ  P : π and for some derivative P ′
of P it holds that P ′ commits to u! (resp. u?). The notion of derivative is
formalised in Section 5.2. The predicate IΓ([∆]) denotes the set of channels
occurring in the domain of CΓ([∆]) together with the polarities they have in
CΓ([∆]). Thus, if
Γ  [u : (S)I] ≤ CΓ([∆])
then u− ∈ IΓ([∆]). Analogously, if
Γ  [u : (S)O] ≤ CΓ([∆])
then u+ ∈ IΓ([∆]).
Lemma 5.1 The operator CΓ is monotonic increasing and a closure operator
on well-formed types in Γ, i.e.
• Γ  π ≤ CΓ(π)
• Γ  π ≤ π′ implies Γ  CΓ(π) ≤ CΓ(π′)
• Γ  CΓ(π) = CΓ(CΓ(π))
Lemma 5.2 If Γ(u) = 〈(τ1, . . . , τn), SO〉, τk = σ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
Γ  a : σ, then Γ  [a : σ] ≤ CΓ([u : (τ1, . . . , τn)I]).
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5.2 Adequacy of the Translation
We show that the behaviours of P and TΓ(P ) are indiscernible within contexts
that are translations of well-typed terms in λπv, but only for value-passing
processes [2]. This means that if Γ  P : π and V is any value that may
occur as the object of a communication event during P ’s execution, then V
is typable in Γ. Thus, extrusion of restricted channels is not allowed (See
Section 6). The result follows from the fact that within this restricted context
occurrences of the ﬁlter operator in TΓ(P ) are “transparent” in the sense that
actions executed by TΓ(P ) or any of the derivatives of TΓ(P ) are never blocked
by these operators.
In the sequel we use the notation V˜ and τ˜ to denote either a vector or a set
of values resp. types, and V˜ : τ˜ to denote a vector or set of bindings, where
the arities of both terms are assumed to be identical. Likewise, we write P\a˜
for P\a1\ . . . \an if a˜ = {a1, . . . , an}. Also, Γ  V˜ : τ˜ denotes Γ  V : τ for
every V : τ ∈ V˜ : τ˜ .
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Γ-Derivative (cf. [7, Section 2.6]) Suppose Γ  P : π =
[∆]. Then we say that P ′ is a Γ-derivative of P if either P =⇒ P ′ or one of
the following two conditions hold:
(i) P =⇒ P ′′, P ′′ ≡ (νa˜ : σ˜a)(u?(x˜ : τ˜ ).Q | R), ∆(u) = 〈(τ˜ ′), S〉, Γ  V˜ : τ˜ ′,
Γ, a˜ : σ˜a  τ˜ ′ ≤ τ˜ , and P ′ is a Γ-derivative of (νa˜ : σ˜a)(Q{V˜ /x˜} | R);
TΓ(P ) = T ∅Γ (P )
T SΓ (P | P ) = T SΓ (P ) | T SΓ (P )
T SΓ (u!〈V1, . . . , Vn〉.P ) = u!〈T ∅Γ (V1), . . . ,T ∅Γ (Vn)〉.T SΓ (P )
T SΓ (u?(x1 : τ1, . . . , xn : τn)P ) = u?(x1, . . . , xn)T S
′
Γ′ (P )
S′ = S ∪ {xi : τi s.t. τi is a HO Value, i = 1, . . . , n}
Γ′ = Γ, x1 : τ1, . . . , xn : τn
T SΓ (∗P ) = ∗T SΓ (P )
T SΓ ((νa : σ)P ) = (νa)T SΓ′ (P ), Γ′ = Γ, a : σ
T SΓ (PP ) = T SΓ (P )T SΓ (P )
T SΓ (u) = if u ∈ dom(S) then FΓ(u, S(u)) else u
T SΓ (λ(x : τ)P ) = λ(x)T SΓ′ (P ), Γ′ = Γ, x : τ
FΓ(P, σB) =P
FΓ(P, proc) =P
FΓ(P, [∆]) =P IΓ([∆])
FΓ(P, (y : σ)→ ρ) = λ(y)(FΓ′(Py, ρ)), Γ′ = Γ, y : σ
FΓ(P, σH → ρ) = λ(y)(FΓ(Py, ρ))
Fig. 4. Translation
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CΓ([]) = []
CΓ([∆, u : σ]) = CΓ([u : σ]) unionsq CΓ([∆])
CΓ([u : 〈SI, SO〉]) = [u : 〈SI, SO〉] unionsq DΓ(SI, S′I) (where Γ(u) = 〈S′I, S′O〉)
DΓ(, S) = []
DΓ((τ1, ..., τn), (τ ′1, ..., τ ′n)) =DΓ(τ1, τ ′1) unionsq . . . unionsq DΓ(τn, τ ′n)
DΓ(σH , σ′H) = []
DΓ(σ, σ′) = C(Γ, σ, σ′)
C(∅, σ, σ′) = []
C((Γ, x : σH), σ, σ′) = C(Γ, σ, σ′)
C((Γ, u : σ′′), σ, σ′) = if Γ  σ′′ ≤ σ′ then C(Γ, σ, σ′) unionsq CΓ([u : σ])
else C(Γ, σ, σ′)
IΓ([∆]) = intface(CΓ([∆]))
interface([]) = ∅
interface([∆, a : 〈SI, SO〉]) = interface([∆]) ∪ P−(a, SI) ∪ P+(a, SO)
P−(u, S) = if S =  then {u−} else ∅
P+(u, S) = if S = ⊥ then {u+} else ∅
Fig. 5. Closure and Interface
(ii) P =⇒ P ′′, P ′′ ≡ (νa˜ : σ˜a)(u!〈V˜ 〉.Q | R), Γ  V˜ : τ˜ , and P ′ is a Γ-derivative
of (νa˜ : σ˜a)(Q | R).
Note that in the deﬁnition of Γ-derivative we require that every object of
communication V is typable in Γ, thus precluding channel extrusion.
Lemma 5.4 Let P be any value-passing process such that Γ  P : CΓ(π) for
some π. Then, for any Γ-derivative P ′ of P , it holds that Γ  P ′ : CΓ(π).
Lemma 5.4 guarantees that the type CΓ(π) is preserved for the derivatives
of any value-passing process.
We can now show that for any value-passing process all occurrences of the
ﬁlter operator in TΓ(P ) are transparent. In order to do this, we introduce T ′Γ ,
an operator from processes in λπv to processes in λπFv, which is deﬁned as TΓ
with the sole exception that the rule
T S
Γ
(u) = if u ∈ dom(S) then FΓ(u, S(u)) else u
in Fig.4 is substituted by the rule
T S
Γ
(u) = if u ∈ dom(S) then F ′
Γ
(u, S(u)) else u
where F ′
Γ
is deﬁned exactly as FΓ, except that the rule
FΓ(P, [∆]) = P IΓ([∆])
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in Fig.4 is substituted by the rule
F ′Γ(P, [∆]) = P.
Hence the ﬁlter operator does not occur in T ′
Γ
(P ).
In order to show that TΓ(P ) and T ′Γ(P ) have identical behaviour we have
only to show that that all occurrences of the ﬁlter operator in TΓ(P ) are
transparent. A labelled transition system for the value-passing calculus may
be deﬁned simply by labelling the transitions in both the premise and the
conclusion of the rule (res) in Fig.3, with the requirement that the subject,
if any, of the transition label is not identical to the restricted channel. The
labelled transition trees thus obtained for TΓ(P ) and T ′Γ (P ) are isomorphic, in
the sense that there is a bijection between the set of labelled transitions for
each pair of identiﬁed nodes. The transition labels may not be identical, and
two labels should be identiﬁed if one is labelled by TΓ(V˜ ) and the other by
T ′Γ(V˜ ), for any V˜ .
It is in this very strict sense that we deﬁne the notion of LT-bisimilarity,
brieﬂy ∼:
Deﬁnition 5.5 [LT-equivalence] Two agents P and Q in the λπFv-calculus
which are both translations from value-passing agents in the λπv-calculus, are
LT-bisimilar, brieﬂy P ∼ Q, if their corresponding labelled transitions trees
are isomorphic, where two labels are identiﬁed if for any V˜ in λπv their labels
are TΓ(V˜ ) (resp. T ′Γ(V˜ )).
We deﬁne Erase(P ), for any P ∈ λπv, as the agent obtained from P by
erasing all type annotations in P . Note that Erase(P ) is a term in λπFv. We
say that P ≈η Q, where P ∈ λπv and Q ∈ λπFv, if there is a η-reduction
identifying Erase(P ) and Q. We deﬁne η-reduction is as in the λ-calculus, i.e.
λx.Mx = M . Finally, we write P = Q if P ≈η∼ Q.
Lemma 5.6 For any Γ and P such that Γ  P : π in [17], it holds that
P ≈η T ′Γ(P ).
The proof follows from lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.7 For any value-passing process P in λπv it holds that TΓ(P ) ∼
T ′Γ(P ).
We obtain thus the main result of this section:
Theorem 5.8 For any value-passing process P in λπv, it holds that P =
TΓ(P ).
In this sense we may claim that the behaviours of P and TΓ(P ) are e-
quivalent within contexts that are well-typed in Γ. Therefore, any reasonable
notion of behaviour equivalence should relate P and TΓ(P ).
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6 Conclusion
The main result of this paper is that only value-passing agents, i.e. agents in
which channels are not extruded, behave correctly under our interpretation
of the resource access policy of the λπv-calculus. As an illustration of the
kind of diﬃculties involved in channel extrusion, consider an agent P and an
environment Γ such that Γ  P : [u : (((int)IO)I)O]. Then P could be deﬁned
as follows:
P = (νb : ((int)IO)I)(u!〈b〉.b?(x : (int)IO)(x!〈3〉 | x?(z)0)).
Hence any channel of type (int)IO might become part of the interface of a
derivative of P , a fact which is not immediately reﬂected by the type of P .
This is not a limitation of the translation, but rather inherent to the typing
of λπv terms. The typing rules of the λπv calculus eliminate information about
channels bound by input preﬁx or by restriction (see Discussion in [17]). Only
channels that can be referenced may become part of the interface of a process.
Restricted channels, by their very nature, cannot be referenced by name, and
thus cannot become part of the interface. Analogously, the ﬁlter operator
cannot ﬁlter actions along channels that cannot be referenced by name.
An alternative is to extend the typing system of the λπv-calculus with a
notion of interface type where information is kept about the type of channels
that may be imported via input actions. Indeed, the notion of closure that
we introduce in this paper is nothing more than an indirect way of partially
recovering this kind of information. Ideally, the type of a process should be
invariant with regard to any kind of transitions, including input events. The
result should be a general version of the subject reduction theorem that ex-
tends to any kind of labelled transitions. We leave this for future investigation.
We note, ﬁnally, that the translation cannot be fully abstract. A decidable
type system will necessarily reject processes that are totally harmless. For
instance, the channel b belongs to the interface of the agent (νa)a!〈b〉, and
may be rejected on these grounds, although this agent may be identiﬁed with
0.
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